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MEDELLIV'S CLEAR STATEMENT RULE:
A SOLUTION FOR INTERNATIONAL
DELEGATIONS
Julian G. Ku*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas' raised
many fascinating structural constitutional issues about the relationship
between federal courts and international courts, the delegation of federal
power to international organizations, and the role of the President in the
enforcement of international court judgments against the states. Yet, Chief
Justice John G. Roberts's opinion for the Court managed to avoid direct
discussion of any of these issues. Instead, it focused almost exclusively on
the doctrine of non-self-execution. The Court's determination that the
relevant treaties were non-self-executing lies at the heart of its decision.
The focus on non-self-execution, however, does not mean that the
complicated structural problems raised by Medellin do not exist. Rather, in
this short essay, I argue that the problem of international delegations is
crucial to understanding and justifying Chief Justice Roberts's application
of the non-self-execution doctrine in Medellin.
As I will explain, the Medellin Court required a clear statement of an
intent to delegate powers to an international tribunal. This approach, I
argue, has the functional benefit of limiting and controlling (but not
prohibiting) the delegation of judicial power to international tribunals. In
this essay, I do not consider questions such as Medellin's consistency with
past precedent or with the original meaning of the text of the U.S.
Constitution. Although such questions are important, I focus here on
providing pragmatic justifications for the Medellin Court's application of
the non-self-execution doctrine. My goal is to establish that the
"delegation" problem lay at the heart of the Medellin case and to explain
how non-self-execution provides the best functional solution to this
problem.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Hofstra University School
of Law. I would like to thank Professor Catherine Powell for inviting me to participate in
this Symposium and the editors of the Fordham Law Review for their assistance in editing
and revising this essay.
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I. MEDELLIN, DELEGATION, AND SELF-EXECUTION
What is an "international delegation"? For the purposes of this essay, an
international delegation is the "transfer" of a sovereign governmental power
to an international institution or organization. Medellin is only one
powerful example of this ongoing and important phenomenon. 2
What are sovereign governmental powers? In the United States, such
powers are allocated by the Constitution to particular branches of the
federal government. The "legislative power," whatever that is, is allocated
to the Congress. 3 The "executive power" is allocated to the President.4 The
"judicial power," at least the federal judicial power, is allocated to the
federal courts. 5
In the United States context, the delegation discussion often centers on
the delegation of legislative power to independent agencies. The concern
there is that the structural separation of powers set up by the Constitution is
undermined when Congress transfers its power to another branch. But
other kinds of delegation problems are raised when executive or judicial
powers are transferred around. For instance, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission is a delegation of judicial power from the federal courts to an
independent agency. 6 Although the decision to delegate is made by
Congress, the power being delegated is a judicial one.
This U.S. constitutional framework is still relevant when we talk about
"international delegations." We might simply talk about delegation of U.S.
sovereign power in general to international organizations. But because all
such sovereign powers are already allocated by the Constitution, any
international delegation will also implicate the domestic separation of
powers framework.
In my lexicon, "international delegations" occur when international
institutions are authorized to exercise a sovereign power of the United
States directly. This might range from the power to impose a treaty
obligation on the United States by, say, amending a treaty regime against
the will of the United States. 7 Or it might be the power to conduct
"enforcement" proceedings by, for instance, conducting inspections and
2. I have discussed and defined the term "international delegations" elsewhere. See
generally Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:
New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I.
4. Id. art. II.
5. Id. art. III.
6. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
7. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX, § 2, Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 9 ("The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the
exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements.... The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths
majority of the Members."); see also id. art. X, § 3 ("The Ministerial Conference may decide
by a three-fourths majority of the Members that any amendment made effective under this
paragraph is of such a nature that any Member which has not accepted it within a period
specified by the Ministerial Conference in each case shall be free to withdraw from the WTO
or to remain a Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference.").
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raids under color of U.S. federal law.8 Or it might be to adopt new
substantive rules under a treaty protocol. Or it might be the power to
resolve the rights of individuals in a particular case by issuing a judicial
determination that all U.S. courts and government agencies must enforce.
In these situations, the power to make substantive governmental
decisions is no longer held by the three branches of government designated
by the Constitution. Whether or not the decisions are good or bad, the
"delegation" problem is that the Constitution intended for that decision to
be exercised by a particular institution pursuant to a particular process.
In all of these instances, the international organization has allocated to
itself some sovereign power of the United States. Not all of such
delegations are equally problematic. But the delegation framework is
useful for analyzing this allocation and reallocation of sovereign
governmental powers.
II. MEDELLIN AND DELEGATIONS
Medellin represents the first time the Supreme Court has directly
confronted the challenge of an international delegation. The petitioner,
seeking to enforce the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment in U.S.
courts, invoked two treaties as the source of the ICJ's authority: the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations9 and
Article 92 of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter. 10 The Optional Protocol
provides that "[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of
the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice."' l Article 92, in turn, obligates each member
of the U.N. to "undertake[] to comply with the decision of the International
Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. 12
Jose Medellin argued that the Optional Protocol's grant of "compulsory
jurisdiction" to the ICJ over disputes arising under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, combined with the U.S. obligation under Article 92
to "undertake[] to comply" with ICJ decisions, required U.S. courts to give
effect to ICJ judgments. 13 Analogizing this legal framework to treaties
requiring the enforcement of foreign court or arbitral judgments, Medellin
argued that the Court here was merely being asked to enforce a foreign
judgment, which U.S. courts do all the time.
8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 21
(1993), 32 I.L.M. 800; see also Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998,
22 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6771 (Supp. IV 1999).
9. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
10. U.N. Charter art. 92.
11. Optional Protocol, supra note 9, art. I.
12. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
13. Brief for Petitioner at 28, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984),
2007 WL 1886212.
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But the character of Medellin's claim was more than a mere enforcement
action. He argued that the Supreme Court was bound by the ICJ's
judgment despite the fact that the Court had previously interpreted the same
treaty provision differently. 14 In other words, the Court was essentially
being asked to disregard its own past interpretations of the same legal
provision due to the authority granted to the ICJ by the Optional Protocol
and the U.N. Charter.
This aspect of the plaintiff's claim thus transforms itself from a mere
foreign judgment enforcement action into a much stronger claim of judicial
power. Unlike the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the plaintiff here
argued that federal statutes required enforcement without exception whether
or not there were public policy ramifications to enforcement. In a typical
foreign judgment enforcement proceeding, U.S. courts have the discretion
to invoke public policy or constitutional norms to reject the enforcement of
foreign judgments. 15 Instead, like a higher court, the judgment of the ICJ
bound the Supreme Court and all lower federal and state courts regardless
of domestic public policies.
Hence, the most accurate way to conceive of the plaintiffs' argument is
as a "delegation" of the judicial power granted to the federal courts under
Article III of the Constitution. The ICJ's authority to order U.S. courts to
follow its judgments is akin to the authority of the Supreme Court to order
state courts to enforce federal law regardless of local state policies and
conflicting state law. 16
Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly call this argument a
"delegation" argument, it did note the remarkable and extraordinary
consequences of agreeing with the petitioner's position:
Moreover, the consequences of Medellin's argument give pause. An
ICJ judgment, the argument goes, is not only binding domestic law but is
also unassailable. As a result, neither Texas nor this Court may look
behind a judgment and quarrel with its reasoning or result. ... Medellin's
interpretation would allow ICJ judgments to override otherwise binding
state law; there is nothing in his logic that would exempt contrary federal
law from the same fate. And there is nothing to prevent the ICJ from
ordering state courts to annul criminal convictions and sentences, for any
reason deemed sufficient by the ICJ. Indeed, that is precisely the relief
Mexico requested. 17
The Court did not complete this analysis, however, by analyzing the
constitutional concerns created by Medellin's argument. What, precisely,
would be the problem with preventing Texas or the Supreme Court from
"quarrel[ing] with [the ICJ judgment's] reasoning and result?"'18  Or
14. Id. at 19.
15. Unif. Foreign Money Judgments Recognitions Act, § 3, 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 39 (2002);
Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
16. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
17. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1362 (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 1350.
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allowing the ICJ to "order[] state courts to annul criminal convictions and
sentences?" 19  The Court does not say. Yet, the most obvious
understanding of its expressions of concern is that such a grant of power
would undermine both the federal judiciary's power to give definitive
interpretations of federal law (treaties) and state courts' abilities to do the
same for state law. With respect to the diminution of federal judicial
power, it could be understood as a violation of Article III's exclusive grant
of the federal judicial power to federal courts.
Still, the Court does not go so far as to suggest that Medellin's argument
creates constitutional problems. On the other hand, it emphasizes that the
unusual consequences of this argument require heightened attention to the
intent of the ratifying parties. "Given that ICJ judgments may interfere with
state procedural rules, one would expect the ratifying parties to the relevant
treaties to have clearly stated their intent to give those judgments domestic
effect, if they had so intended."'20 Justice John Paul Stevens, in his
concurring opinion, concluded that there was no such clear statement in the
text of either the Optional Protocol's grant of "compulsory jurisdiction" or
Article 92's language requiring the U.S. to "undertake to comply" with ICJ
judgments.21
It is this analysis that is both the doctrinal weakness and functional
strength of the majority opinion. If, as the opinion suggests, the case is
simply a plain-vanilla treaty interpretation case, then the doctrine of self-
execution would be applied. But, although some scholars have argued for a
clear statement rule before finding a treaty self-executing, it is far from
settled that a clear statement of intent is required to find a treaty self-
executing. Indeed, the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States implies the opposite rule: First, the Restatement declares
that "[c]ourts in the United States are bound to give effect to...
international agreements of the United States" unless the agreement is non-
self-executing. 22  But non-self-execution only occurs if an agreement
"manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law
without the enactment of implementing legislation." 23  In other words,
unless there is a manifestation of an intent toward non-self-execution, the
background presumption is that all treaties are self-executing.
In this sense, Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent justly attacked the majority
for adopting a "new" clear statement rule for self-execution. 24 In any event,
if the Court was adopting a new clear statement rule, can such a
requirement be justified? In the concluding section, I argue that, at least in
19. Id. at 1364.
20. Id. at 1363-64 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1373-74 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111(3) (1987).
23. Id. § I 1l(4)(a).
24. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the special context of international delegations, a resort to a clear statement
rule for self-execution is both justified and necessary.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL CASE FOR NON-SELF-EXECUTION
It is a well-accepted canon of statutory interpretation that a court should,
whenever possible, adopt an interpretation that avoids a finding of
unconstitutionality. As a number of scholars have observed, this prudential
doctrine has become the primary mechanism by which constitutional
doctrines like nondelegation are applied.25 In other words, rather than
apply the nondelegation doctrine to find a statute unconstitutional, courts
are more likely to seek an interpretation that avoids an excessive delegation.
Indeed, a number of influential scholars have argued that, in the statutory
context, the emphasis on avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality has led
courts to require a clear statement before interpreting a statute to delegate.
The application of this prudential doctrine acts as a constitutional
constraint, although not as a constitutional bar, to excessive delegations.
As I have argued elsewhere,26 the clear statement requirement for statutes
can be adapted to the treaty context through the doctrine of non-self-
execution. By requiring a clear statement before interpreting a treaty to
result in an international delegation, courts can place constitutional
constraints on treaty makers while avoiding the complications of an actual
finding of unconstitutionality.
Medellin provides an excellent example of the benefits of this prudential
clear statement approach. Interpreting the U.N. Charter provisions and the
Optional Protocol as non-self-executing does not create a constitutional bar
to future U.S. cooperation with the ICJ or with international dispute
resolution systems in general. Instead, it shifts the decision-making locus to
Congress and requires full congressional cooperation over how and whether
to incorporate international decision makers into the U.S. legal system. It
not only gives the House of Representatives an opportunity, but it also
forces the House (along with the Senate and the President) to consider the
consequences of an international delegation on domestic law and policy. In
other international dispute resolution schemes, the House and Senate have
done just that and clearly stated a desire to delegate such authority to an
international tribunal. In other situations, most notably the World Trade
Organization (WTO) system, Congress has decided to retain control over
compliance with WTO judgments.27
25. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 597 (1992); Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 330-37 (2000) (discussing how
courts use nondelegation canons to impose constraints on administrative power).
26. See Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006).
27. See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (2000)
(barring anyone other than the United States from challenging U.S. or state action or inaction
based on its consistency with the Uruguay Round Agreements); H.R. REP. No. 103-316, at
675-77, 1043-44 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4054-56, 4327.
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Allowing Congress the power to determine whether and how to comply
with international obligations makes sense from a functional perspective.
Mediating between various U.S. obligations and commitments in a
particular foreign policy circumstance is difficult for courts. They are
unable to take into account particular information or factors. For instance,
the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon28 couldn't consider the
nonlegal factors such as the overall relationship between the United States
and Mexico, the problems of the death penalty, etc. But Congress, the
President, or the states could take those matters into account when
considering those obligations.
There are further benefits to a presumption of non-self-execution in the
context of international delegations. By guaranteeing full consideration by
Congress (or forcing a clear statement by the Senate), this prudential
approach should reduce fear and uncertainty about entering into long-term
cooperative arrangements with international organizations. If ambiguous
treaty language would be enough to transfer broad authority to international
organizations, the Senate might be less inclined to enter into such a treaty in
the first place. Non-self-execution creates a safe harbor for Senate treaties
ensuring that, absent a clear statement, no international delegation will take
place.
CONCLUSION
Some might read Medellin as a significant alteration in the non-self-
execution doctrine for all treaties, whether they involve international
delegations or not. Indeed, the decision might very well be criticized from
this perspective as departing from existing understandings of the non-self-
execution doctrine and imposing a new clear statement requirement.
I deliberately avoid addressing that larger dispute here. Rather, my
purpose is simply to offer a narrower understanding and defense of the new
Medellin clear statement rule. Unlike many treaties that have less clear
language but that have nonetheless been interpreted as self-executing,
Medellin involved the delegation of judicial power to an international
tribunal in tension with Article III. This tension, obliquely acknowledged
by the Medellin Court, helps to explain and justify its clear statement
requirement. Indeed, it represents a salutary effort to mediate the need to
enter into deeper and more elaborate mechanisms of international dispute
resolution with continuing concerns about the dangers of transfers of power
to international institutions.
28. 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
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